Meaning and Racial Slurs: Derogatory Epithets and the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface by Hedger, Joseph A.
Meaning and Racial Slurs:
Derogatory Epithets and the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface

Joseph A. Hedger




The semantics of racial slurs has recently become a locus of debate amongst philosophers. While everyone agrees that slurs are offensive, there is disagreement about the linguistic mechanism responsible for this offensiveness. This paper places the debate about racial slurs into the context of a larger issue concerning the interface between semantics and pragmatics, and argues that even on minimalist assumptions, the offensiveness of slur words is more plausibly due to their semantic content rather than any pragmatic mechanism (including conventional implicature). Finally, I note that slurs make a good test case for expanding our semantic theories beyond the truth conditional tradition of Frege, which will be necessary in order to broaden the types of expressions handled by semantic theories.

1. Introduction
	It is a standard move in philosophy to argue that part of the meaning of particular groups of expressions is due to the pragmatics rather than the semantics of those expressions. For instance, as Kevan Edwards (2009) notes, part of the Direct Reference tradition in the philosophy of language involves the strategy of pushing messiness over into pragmatics whenever possible, in order to keep a neat, orderly, and austere semantics. This notion of semantics better coheres with the Kripke (1980) intuitions, as Edwards points out. A classic case study in this methodology is Kripke (1977), where he argues against a semantic ambiguity interpretation of Donnellan (1966)’s referential and attributive uses of definite descriptions, and concludes that this feature is part of pragmatics, or speaker meaning, rather than semantic meaning.
	A similar move is made by Robert Stalnaker (1999; Chapters 1 and 2). P. F. Strawson (1950) argues against Russell (1905)’s theory of definite descriptions by claiming that a statement containing an empty definite description (i.e. one which has no referent) uttered “out of the blue” would intuitively not be considered false as Russell’s analysis yields. Instead, it would lead to a sort of puzzlement on the part of the audience, which Strawson (1952) argues is due to the failure of a presupposition that a definite description which occurs as the logical subject of a sentence should refer to an object.​[1]​ Without the satisfaction of this presupposition, the statement fails to express a proposition, and so is neither true nor false.​[2]​ Stalnaker (1999) responds that presupposition of this sort belongs to the pragmatic meaning of such sentences, and is better understood as involving conversational maxims and background knowledge of the conversational participants (á la Grice) rather than having to muddy up semantics with so-called “gappy” propositions.​[3]​ Other cases noted by Jeffrey King and Jason Stanley (2005) include avoiding contextualism concerning ‘know’ and internalism concerning reasons in ethics by arguing that the facts which support each of these views are a product of the use rather than the semantic meaning of utterances.
	There are philosophers on both sides of these debates, but in general my own sympathies lie with the side which is conservative regarding semantic content (roughly coinciding with what might be called the Direct Reference tradition in the philosophy of language). The general moral to be drawn from these case studies is what Paul Grice (1989) calls a Modified Occam’s Razor (pp. 47-49). Basically, the idea is not to multiply semantic meaning (including ambiguities) beyond necessity. As Edwards (2009) and others recognize, following this general principle has the pragmatic advantage of making our semantic theories more simple, precise, and theoretically tractable. In a word, it helps us to avoid messiness in our semantic theories and pushes such complications over into the area of pragmatics, which we already know is going to be vastly complicated. One disadvantage to this method, not often discussed, is that it writes checks that our pragmatic theory must eventually cash. Still, the benefits of this methodology are well worth this cost, and so throughout this paper I shall try to adhere to this procedure.
	Racial, ethnic, and religious slurs have recently become a locus of debate for philosophers of language (see e.g. Anderson and Lepore, 2013; Hom, 2008; Hornsby, 2001; Richard, 2008; Williamson, 2009). The issue of the meaning of racial slurs and the issue of where to draw the line between semantics and pragmatics intersect in some interesting ways. Of course, everyone in this debate agrees that racial slurs are offensive. A key disagreement, which this paper will address, is whether this offensiveness is better understood as part of the semantic content of slur words or whether it is instead part of their pragmatic meaning. I will argue that the offensiveness of slur words is part of the semantic meaning of those expressions. I want to urge that even accepting the semantic minimalist methodology outlined above, there are very strong reasons to come to this conclusion. A key difference between the two kinds of views concerns whether a racial slur has any effect on the truth conditions of statements which include them as a constituent.
	Although my ultimate goal is that the claim argued for in this paper (viz. that the offensiveness of racial slurs should be considered part of their semantic content) can be accepted independently of my overall view concerning the semantics of slur words, I will occasionally refer to the sketch of a semantic theory found in Hedger (2012). In that paper, I make use of David Kaplan (2005)’s distinction between two different kinds of semantic content, descriptive and expressive. Roughly, descriptive content describes or represents the world as being some way or another, and hence can be true or false. Expressive content displays the attitude of the speaker, and although it can be genuine or not, it is not the sort of content which can be either true or false.​[4]​ I argue that derogatory epithets can be divided into two distinct classes—those which contain both descriptive and expressive content and those which contain purely expressive content. Slurs express contempt but don’t say anything about or describe their targets, and thus are composed of purely expressive content. I offer some further considerations in support of this view in the Conclusion, below. In this paper my subject will be paradigmatic slur words, and so I set aside issues arising with other derogatory terms or with appropriated slurs (i.e. those used to address the “insiders” of certain groups).
2. Semantics and Pragmatics
	Roughly, semantics concerns the linguistic meaning of strings of language, and pragmatics concerns the ways in which speakers use those strings. As Jennifer Saul (2002) notes, Grice (1989)’s basic distinction between what is said (semantics) and what is implicated or what is meant (pragmatics) has an immediate intuitive appeal. Grice (1961)’s example of a letter of recommendation makes this distinction clear and immediately understandable (paraphrased from pp. 129-130):
A philosophy professor asked to write a letter of recommendation for one of his students (named Jones) writes, “Jones has beautiful handwriting and his English is grammatical.” Although the professor’s assertion was complimentary and regarded Jones’s handwriting and grammar, the obvious conclusion to be drawn from these remarks is that Jones is no good at philosophy. This is, of course, because letters of recommendation are supposed to be praiseworthy, but here the professor did not praise Jones’s abilities at philosophy, but instead praised his handwriting, which is much less relevant for the job. What the professor said (i.e. the semantic content of his speech act) was that Jones has beautiful handwriting and that his English is grammatical, but what the professor implicated (i.e. the pragmatic content of his speech act) was that Jones is not good at philosophy and doesn’t deserve the position. It is clear that although the professor implicated that Jones is no good at philosophy, he never explicitly said this.
However, as many philosophers have pointed out, beyond these rough and ready characterizations, making a clear and precise distinction between semantic meaning and pragmatic meaning which is not controversial is not an easy task. So, for instance, Saul (2002) goes on to argue that most philosophers and linguists have gotten Grice’s concept of implicature wrong. Nonetheless, on the face of it this rough and ready characterization clearly supports the idea that the offensiveness of slurs is part of their semantic content. Slurs are offensive in every use, no matter the context of conversation. (Notice that in a different context, the professor’s speech act would not carry the same implicature.) Furthermore, the contemptuous attitude is part of what a speaker says when he uses a slur. (A slur can’t be uttered without saying something derogatory.) I intend to argue in what follows that a more careful consideration bears out this initial intuitive judgment.
3. Truth Conditions, Semantic Content, and Racial Slurs
	A successful tradition in linguistics and the philosophy of language (dating back to at least Frege) has truth conditions playing a large role in the semantic content of a statement.​[5]​ As e.g. Paul Portner (2005) proposes: “The knowledge of meaning involves (at least) the knowledge of the conditions under which a sentence is true, and those under which it’s false. So let’s begin our semantic investigation by focusing on this particular aspect of meaning as if it is all there is to the semantics of sentences. It’s worth seeing where that gets us” (p. 13). Stalnaker (1999) agrees that “Formal semantics abstracts the problem of giving truth-conditions for sentences away from problems concerning the purposes for which those sentences are uttered” (p. 32).
For Frege, the proposition or “thought” expressed by a statement is what is true or false (see e.g. Frege, 1956). Although he didn’t use the terms “semantics” and “pragmatics,” it is reasonably clear that for Frege the thought of a sentence is its semantic content, and anything which doesn’t affect the truth conditions of an indicative sentence sincerely uttered is part of pragmatics. Thus he says:
An indicative sentence often contains, as well as a thought and the assertion, a third component over which the assertion does not extend. This is often said to act on the feelings, the mood of the hearer or to arouse his imagination. Words like ‘alas’ and ‘thank God’ belong here. …all constituents of sentences to which the assertive force does not reach do not belong to scientific exposition… It makes no difference to the thought whether I use the word “horse” or “steed” or “cart-horse” or “mare.” The assertive force does not extend over that in which these words differ. What is called mood, fragrance, illumination in a poem … does not belong to the thought. (Frege 1956, p. 295)
He goes on to include the words ‘still’ and ‘already’ among those which do not affect the semantic content of a sentence containing them, and even gives the same analysis for ‘but’ that Grice would later make famous, viz. that it’s logically and semantically equivalent to ‘and’ but intimates a contrast between what precedes and what follows it (Frege 1956, pp. 295-296; cf. Grice 1961, p. 127 ff.).​[6]​
	Hence, on the face of it, Frege, Grice and others have given us a clear test of whether at least some words contribute to the semantic meaning of a sentence or not. Just as with ‘but’ (and, according to Grice, 1989, other connectives such as ‘although,’ ‘nevertheless,’ and ‘in spite of the fact’), we can substitute the word in a given sentence with a more neutral word (in this case ‘and’) and check to see if that can make a true sentence false (or a false sentence true). This would seem to be an ideal test for discovering whether the offensive content of slur words contributes to the semantic content of a sentence, since for most slur words a neutral counterpart word which lacks the offensiveness readily comes to mind. Thus we can ask the following question: Given that (1) is true, could we make it false by substituting an offensive slur word in place of ‘black’?
	(1) Obama is the first black U.S. President.
Call (1)* the result of replacing ‘black’ in (1) with a slur word. Intuitively, we would hesitate in affirming (1)* as true, even if we may not think of the resulting statement as being outright false. Hedger (2012) argues that the semantic content of a slur word is not truth apt, and hence that many statements containing a slur will be neither true nor false.​[7]​ This would explain why we hesitate assigning a truth value (whether true or false) to (1)*. However, intuitions of the truth value of statements such as (1)* are not consistent across subjects and therefore not reliable.
	A more stringent test might be the following. If semantic content closely aligns with truth conditions, then if A and B are two statements which are roughly identical in semantic content, one should be able to make a logically valid inference from A to B. For instance, assuming that ‘polite’ and ‘courteous’ are roughly synonymous, (2) involves a logically valid inference from A to B.
	(2) A. Tom is polite.
	      B. Tom is courteous.
However, the inference from (3) A to B is intuitively not a logically valid inference.​[8]​
	(3) A. Obama is black.
	      B. Obama is a *.
In (3), B should not logically follow from A. As before, I think the ordinary (non-racist) speaker would be reluctant to assent to the truth of B, even if she accepts the truth of A. Following Richard (2008), I think that this is because agreeing to the truth of B is the same as endorsing the racist thought expressed by B.​[9]​ A and B express different thoughts. More firm support for this besides intuitions concerning the truth or falsity of B comes from the stronger intuition that B is not a logically valid inference from A. Since logic is concerned only with truth, and since semantic content determines truth conditions, this constitutes an argument that A and B differ in semantic content. This methodology is endorsed for instance by Gauker (in press), who notes that “Even theorists who disagree about the basic framework for semantics might nonetheless agree that a semantic theory has as one of its aims the characterization of validity,” and hence suggests that we “appeal to such logical properties in trying to decide between different approaches to [controversial] phenomena.”​[10]​
	Thus, what Frege called “mood” can have an effect on the truth conditions, and hence the semantic content, in some (perhaps rare) cases.​[11]​ The statements (3) A and (3) B express different thoughts. A is true and is able to evoke pride and admiration, while B is a racist thought, is despicable and ought to be condemned. Frege was surely correct that substituting synonymous words or phrases cannot alter truth conditions of a statement, and also that most words or phrases that he referred to as “mood” do not change the truth conditions of a statement. However, the use of a slur affects more than the mood of an expression. Often we can agree with the representational content of an utterance even if we disagree with (or don’t share) the attitude which accompanies it. However, in the case of slurs the attitude expressed is inseparable from any descriptive content contained in the utterance, and taints it to such an extent that non-racists cannot assent to any portion of the utterance whatsoever.
Another way that propositions and semantic content are typically characterized is as the content of propositional attitudes (cf. e.g. King & Stanley, 2005, p. 121; Soames, 2010, p. 111). In the case of any sincere assertion that φ, we can say that the speaker believes that φ. If we agree that φ is true, then we also believe that φ. This, I take it, is part of the lesson of Moore’s paradox and Timothy Williams and John Hawthorne on the knowledge norm of assertion. In the case of (3) B, there is no way to characterize the speaker’s belief content which does not contain an expression of contempt or in a way which is not offensive.​[12]​ Furthermore, unless we are racist, we do not believe what the speaker of (3) B expresses, and so we should not say that what he utters is true. 
In general, following Elisabeth Camp (2012) on arguments concerning sarcasm, we can note that the offensive content of slurs exhibit three typical characteristics of semantic meaning.​[13]​ It is conventional, in the sense that any competent language speaker recognizes the attitude of contempt and the general offensiveness of slurs; it is tightly constrained, in the sense that the offensiveness or expression of contempt is not able to be detached from the word by any pragmatic or other speaker device; and finally, it is highly systematic, in that the contempt and offensiveness are predictable without any information about the conversational context of the utterance.
4. Semantic Meaning, Context, and Conventional Implicature
	Another common and intuitive way to characterize the semantic content of an utterance is to say that the semantic content is what remains stable and does not change across different contexts of conversation. Indexicals may seem to pose a prima facie difficulty for this sort of approach. However, on the standard Kaplan (1989) treatment of indexicals, they have a character which remains constant and, along with conversational context, determines their semantic content. The character part of the meaning of indexicals does not change from context to context. Instead, we have a rather special case in that the context helps to supply the referent of indexicals in order to make a complete thought. Likewise, Scott Soames (2008) argues that in some cases the semantic content of a sentence does not result in a complete proposition, but requires pragmatic contributions in order to be truth evaluable. (The example he offers is the case of numerical quantifier phrases, such as sentences of the form ‘I have 2 F’s.’) Nonetheless the semantic content of such utterances remains the same no matter the context. 
	As we noted earlier, this line of reasoning leads to the conclusion that the offensiveness of slurs is part of their semantic content. No matter the context of conversation, the use of a slur is offensive and expresses contempt. Although Christopher Hom (2008) purports to give some examples of non-derogatory uses of slurs, I follow Luvell Anderson and Ernie Lepore (2013) in urging that these examples are clearly offensive. Furthermore, I have yet to find a single informant who sides with Hom (2008) on this issue. Hence, since a slur word is offensive in any context, the offensiveness is part of the semantic meaning of slur words, and is not a result of any peculiar use of slurs. For instance, contrast the case of slur words with the following example, where the expression of contempt is clearly because of the speaker’s use of the expressions.​[14]​ 
Suppose that Bill has a mother-in-law who thinks very little of philosophers. Whenever she is asked what Bill does for a living, whether or not he makes good money, etc, she replies “He’s a PHILOSOPHER,” stressing the word ‘philosopher’ as she says it with a sneer and rolling her eyes. In this example, Bill’s mother-in-law uses the term ‘philosopher’ as an expression of contempt. However, the word doesn’t carry this expression of contempt in other uses (when Bill uses the word, e.g.). Thus, in this case the offensiveness is a pragmatic feature of a peculiar use of the word by Bill’s mother-in-law. This case is analogous to that of irony. Thus Szabó (2005) notes: “Suppose I utter the sentence ‘He is a fine friend’ contemptuously. The interpretation of my utterance must be sensitive to my contempt; otherwise the addressee will misunderstand me in the worst possible way. But intuitively, the sentence means what it does quite independently of my manifest attitude in uttering it.” Slurs are not like this, however. Slurs express contempt regardless of the attitude or particular use of the speaker. In the case of slurs, the independent meaning just is an offensive expression of contempt; hence the expression is part of the semantic content of slurs.
Of course, the major monkey wrench for the picture here presented is Grice (1989)’s notion of conventional implicature, which Williamson (2009) uses to account for the meaning of racial slurs. It a strange anomaly in Grice’s otherwise intuitive picture, and appears to threaten his otherwise clean and useful distinction between what is said and what is implicated; so much so that Kent Bach (1999) argues that we can and should do without conventional implicature in our linguistic theories. (Although I am sympathetic to this, I set this issue aside since it is tangential to our present purposes. See Hedger, unpublished, and Kaplan 2005 for some purported counterexamples to conventional implicature.) Szabó (2005b) argues that “Since conventional implicature is a matter of linguistic meaning, it would be odd to say that Grice intended to exclude it from the scope of semantics” (p. 3). However, Grice clearly thinks that conventional implicatures do not have an effect on truth conditions, and so either way the phenomenon remains an anomaly within Frege-style semantics.
Importantly, slurs are distinct from Grice (1989)’s typical examples of conventional implicature, and so I think that (even if we accept that there are such things) slurs are a poor candidate for conventional implicature. For instance, according to most linguists, including Karttunen and Peters (1979), a direct challenge to a statement containing a conventional implicature is only a challenge to what was said, and may even “signal tacit acceptance of what the sentence conventionally implicates” (p. 14). For example, ‘even’ is often given as an example of conventional implicature. Thus, the semantic content and truth conditions of (4) are equivalent to (5) A, but (4) also implicates (5) B and C, although the falsity of either does not make (4) false:​[15]​
(4) Even Joe could prove that logical derivation.
(5) A. Joe could prove that logical derivation.
      B. Other people besides Joe could prove that logical derivation.
      C. Of the people under consideration, Joe is the least likely to prove that logical     derivation.
Therefore, a direct challenge to (4), such as (6), challenges (5) A, but is compatible with (perhaps even implies) acceptance of (5) B and C.
	(6) I don’t believe that!
According to Williamson, (7) shares the same semantic content and truth conditions as (8) A, but conventionally implicates something along the lines of (8) B:
	(7) Obama is a *.
	(8) A. Obama is black.
	      B. Blacks are contemptible.
However, a direct challenge to (7), such as (6), is a challenge to the contempt contained in (7), and is not a challenge to (8) A and is not an acceptance of (8) B. Incidentally, this is also further evidence that the contempt or offensiveness of (7) is part of its semantic content, since (6) can be heard as a challenge to the offensiveness of (7), even on the part of one who readily accepts (8) A.
	(7) Obama is a *.
	(6) I don’t believe that!
	A related point involves questions. Normally, in the case of conventional implicature one can assent to the question, thereby assenting to the semantic content expressed in the question, but then challenge the implicature. This is seen, for instance, in (9).
	(9) Could even Joe prove that logical derivation?
                    Yes, but Joe is better at logical derivations than most other people.
However, this is not the same with (10).
	(10) Is Obama a *?
	      # Yes, but blacks are not contemptible.​[16]​
	Other evidence comes from cases of embedding. According to Karttunen and Peters (1979), embedding statements containing conventional implicature under verbs such as ‘hope,’ ‘believe,’ ‘suspect’ or ‘fear,’ attributes the implicature to the subject associated with the verb rather than the speaker (p. 20). Furthermore, the implicatures fail to be inherited at all when embedded under ‘report,’ ‘say,’ ‘claim,’ and similar verbs. Thus, (11) A attributes the implicated content of (4) to John, while (11) B is non-committal concerning (5) B and C (according to Karttunen & Peters, 1979, at least; the difference between 11 A and B is a bit unclear to me in this regard).
	(11) A. John suspects that even Joe could prove that logical derivation.
	        B. John claims that even Joe could prove that logical derivation.
However, in the case of both (12) A and B, the offensiveness of the slur is inherited by the speaker.
	(12) A. John suspects that Obama will become the first * President.
	        B. John claims that Obama will become the first * President.
A speaker who utters either (12) A or (12) B is being offensive, because we attribute the slur word (and the corresponding belief or thought) to the speaker and not to John.​[17]​
	Another contrast concerns embedding under ‘just discovered’. According to Karttunen and Peters (1979), embedding a conventional implicature within a ‘I just discovered …’ clause commits the speaker to the semantic content of the embedded sentence but not to the implicated content (pp. 21-22). Thus (13) A commits the speaker to (13) B but not to (13) C:
	(13) A. I just discovered that even Joe could prove that logical derivation.
	     B. I just discovered that Joe could prove that logical derivation.
	     C. I just discovered that other people besides Joe could prove that logical derivation.
However, (14) cannot be uttered without committing the speaker to some offensive expression of contempt.
	(14) I just discovered that Obama is the first * to become President.
	Lastly, Bach (2006) makes a point against claiming that expressive adjectives in general are examples of conventional implicature, which would apply to slurs if one accepted the pure expressivist line of Hedger (2012). The point is that whatever content is implicated must be a thought which can be believed, and so it must represent the world as being some way or another. The content of an implicature must be a proposition which the listener can agree or disagree with; it must contain some descriptive content in order to be a candidate for something which a speaker can implicate. He says
To implicate something entails meaning it, that is, intending to convey it to one’s audience. Presumably what is meant is a proposition, something that anybody can entertain and believe. But what is meant when one uses an expressive adjective? If I say, That blasted TV isn’t working, what do I mean in addition to the proposition that the TV is not working? [Cf. ‘That * Obama increased spending on scientific research.’] Is it something that my audience can agree or disagree with? I do not see that it is… But if that is right, then I do not mean ANYTHING in using blasted, although I certainly express a certain negative feeling toward my TV. Although my audience can recognize that I am expressing this feeling, in using blasted I do not MEAN that I have this feeling. I am expressing that feeling, not implicating it.
The same point could be made about expressions such as ‘ouch’ or about racial slurs. The main point is that they don’t convey any information beyond the attitude which the speaker expresses by using it. 
	Lastly, Christopher Potts (2005)—the most fully worked out formal semantic model of conventional implicature—considers the content that is conventionally implicated to be distinct from what he calls the “at issue” semantic content of the statement. However, this doesn’t seem to be the correct characterization of the offensiveness of racial slurs at all. Indeed, the attitude of contempt which is expressed by a slurring use of a slur word is intuitively not only part of the “at issue” content of typical statements containing them, but may even seem to be the main point of such racist remarks.
5. Conclusion
The considerations brought to bear in this paper strongly suggest that the offensiveness of slurs should be considered part of their semantic content. Furthermore, the final point concerning conventional implicature in the previous section makes the most sense if we adopt the overall view from Hedger (2012) that slur words contain solely expressive content, so I will close by saying a few things in favor of this theory of the semantics of racial slurs. First, Kaplan (2005)’s framework may be useful as we continue to expand the types of expressions which our semantic theory can accommodate. Even before we are able to move beyond indicative statements, we should recognize that there exist semantic contents which don’t behave normally when embedded in certain logical constructions. These include statements containing presuppositions, unrestrictive relative clause constructions, and (of course) racial, religious, and ethnic slurs. The simple fact of the matter is that we know that statements containing slurs remain offensive when embedded under logical operators such as negation and as the antecedents of material conditionals. Hence, we already know that Frege-style truth conditional semantics will eventually need to be supplemented with something else. In that sense, slurs make a great test case for expanding our semantic apparatus, and the theory presented in Hedger (2012) looks like a plausible candidate for further exploration.
A second, somewhat related, point is that eventually we will need a theory which can account for putative statements which are simply not truth apt. We must recognize that some complete thoughts, which are e.g. candidates for the content of some propositional attitudes, are simply not appropriate as bearers of truth or falsity. To be considered either true or false, a thought must represent the world in some way or other. If the representation is an accurate reflection of the world then we say that the thought is true; otherwise it is false. However, expressions of attitude (the familiar example being cheering and jeering at a sports event) do not represent the world in any way. This will be less troubling for those linguists and philosophers who already accept statements which are not truth-evaluable for independent reasons, such as a certain view of semantic presupposition influenced by Strawson (1950, 1952).​[18]​ One common objection can be dealt with immediately. It is sometimes said in reply to a view such as that exemplified in Hedger (2012) that slurs can behave syntactically like descriptive predicates, and that nothing in the syntax of a statement such as (7) distinguishes it from a statement such as (8) A. However, as familiar examples from Chomsky and Lewis Carroll make clear, syntax is not sufficient for making a statement which is even meaningful, much less a bearer of truth or falsity (cf. Smith, 2004, on this point; pp. 185-188. See also note 7, above). 
Anderson and Lepore (2013) present interesting arguments against semantic accounts of the offensiveness of slurs. Answering these in detail would itself take an entire paper. However, their argument is not going to be fully successful until they can also provide a plausible positive account of the offensiveness of slurs, given that they think it doesn’t stem from any familiar linguistic mechanism. As it stands, their positive account appears to be implausible, and to severely reverse the order of explanation. They argue that the offensiveness of slurs is because of a censure against their usage, while the most sensible explanation would be that they have been censured because they are offensive. If slurs weren’t censured because of their offensiveness, then what could possibly explain why they were censured in the first place? 
Furthermore, on the face of it, censure seems to count neither as a necessary nor a sufficient condition for offensiveness. For instance, slurs have not been censured by particular communities of racists (such as the Ku Klux Klan, perhaps). Nonetheless their use of slurs remains offensive. So censure doesn’t appear to be necessary for offensiveness. Also, certain communities of artists have censured the use of certain phrases at times in the past, and these have not resulted in the phrases being offensive. In any case, even if we were to accept their story about the source of the offensiveness of slurs, Anderson & Lepore would seem to be making the common mistake of confusing the source or determinant of meaning as part of the meaning itself. (Arguably, Chalmers’ 2-D semantics and Frege’s theory of the semantic content of proper names are other examples of this same error.) That is, even if censure is the ultimate explanation for the offensiveness of slurs, that wouldn’t change the fact that offensiveness is now part of their meaning, and furthermore (as with Chalmers and Frege) making that which causes meaning part of the meaning itself makes for an unnecessarily complicated and confusing linguistic theory.
In conclusion, then, utilizing a number of different methods for drawing the distinction between semantics and pragmatics, we have good evidence that the expressive meaning and offensiveness of slur words should be considered part of the semantic meaning of such words (and of expressions containing them). We have also seen that slurs do not behave like familiar examples of conventional implicature, so that even if we accept conventional implicature, the content of slurs which makes them offensive is more likely semantic than pragmatic. Our future semantic theory will thus need to accommodate the unique projection behaviors and logical inference relations of this offensive content.
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^1	  Strawson further disagrees with Russell’s claim that the object satisfying the definite description needs to be unique, but that needn’t concern us here.
^2	  Geach (1950) makes the same point.
^3	  Indeed, Grice (1989, Essay 17) made this same move in 1970, by arguing that what Strawson attributes to semantic presupposition is better explained in terms of conversational implicature, which is a pragmatic feature of the type of utterance. (The Stalnaker papers were first published in 1970 and 1974.)
^4	  An anonymous referee worries that my description conflates Kaplan’s distinction between descriptive and expressive semantic content with the ethical non-cognitivist descriptive/expressive distinction, and that it is only according to the latter view that expressive content is not truth-apt. Although the issue is complicated by the fact that Kaplan (2005) suggests an alternate view of an inference’s validity in terms of “information delimitation” rather than truth preservation, he is quite clear that e.g. the expression ‘ouch’ by itself “lacks a truth value” (p. 16). Kaplan’s idea is that an expression is “expressively correct” just in case it displays what is the case, which is usually an attitude of the speaker. In his example, the sentence “That damn Kaplan was promoted” is descriptively correct just in case Kaplan was promoted, and expressively correct just in case the derogatory attitude towards Kaplan displayed by ‘damn’ is genuinely held by the speaker. If the statement is both descriptively correct and expressively correct, then it is what Kaplan calls “true-plus.” (See Williamson 2009, especially footnote 17, for criticisms of Kaplan’s notion of information delimitation.)Kaplan’s view about slurs (confirmed by personal communication) is that they contain both descriptive and expressive content, and hence most (if not all) statements containing slurs may potentially be true-plus. In my view, slurs contain only expressive content (and so mirror Kaplan 2005’s analysis of ‘damn,’ ‘frigging’ and ‘bastard’). See Hedger (2012) for more on the difference between our views, and criticisms of Kaplan’s account of slurs. I don’t have a worked out theory of an evaluative dimension for expressive content (which is needed since truth doesn’t apply), but I would favor an account in terms of the appropriateness of the attitude displayed rather than Kaplan’s idea that a language string is expressively correct just in case the attitude displayed is genuinely held by the speaker.
^5	  Besides Frege (1956), see e.g. Davidson (1967), Field (1977), Lewis (1970), Lycan (1984), and Stalnaker (1999) for paradigmatic examples.
^6	  Frege’s analysis of ‘but’ dates back to at least 1879, as it also occurs in the Begriffsschrift. See Geach and Black (1952), p. 10.
^7	  In this particular example, the expressive content of (1)* would result in an incomplete predicate on my view, and no clear descriptive content, so that the resulting semantic content lacks a truth value even after assigning ‘Obama’ to the argument position. Perhaps Kaplan (2005) would give a similar analysis for ‘Joe is a bastard’, since he seems to hold that ‘bastard’ is devoid of descriptive content (and is only “a completely general denigrating expressive”). If I am reading Kaplan correctly, then we are in complete agreement that the syntax of a word such as ‘bastard’ can mislead our analysis of its semantic content. In my view, slurs—which can also syntactically function as predicate adjectives—are in the same boat.
^8	  Here and throughout, I use * as a schematic symbol in place of an offensive racial, ethnic, or religious slur. The offensiveness of slurs is such that I wish to avoid even mentioning (much less using) any of them. Unfortunately, most competent speakers are familiar with many examples of such words, and thinking to oneself an example which one finds particularly offensive in place of * will facilitate many of the intuitions which I rely on for my arguments throughout this paper.
^9	  Richard (2008) uses the example ‘That building is full of *’s’ (p. 13 ff.)
^10	  This argument relies on speaker intuitions, as do many linguistic arguments. One potential problem is that racist speakers (who are nonetheless competent language users) might not share this intuition. This is an empirical question, but I doubt that most racists would think this inference is completely generalizable. At any rate, surely the fact that most speakers would deny that this is a valid inference is a datum to be taken seriously.
^11	  Here I am in agreement with Kaplan (2005).
^12	  An anonymous referee points out that perhaps if one gave a translation of the statement along the lines of Hom (2008)’s analysis (“S said that Obama ought to be subject to the set of [discriminatory racist] pratices P because of having the set of negative properties N, all because of being black”), then one can avoid the contempt and offensiveness of the original assertion. I am not sure that this would in fact avoid the offensiveness, especially when one leaves out the explanatory qualifier in brackets, which is not strictly part of the content. At any rate, this analysis of the meaning of a slur is highly contentious and certainly not one I would agree with. What I say here strikes me as pre-theoretically true.
^13	  In the end, Camp doesn’t endorse the view that sarcasm is part of semantics, but I think the three markers she notes are nonetheless illustrative.
^14	  This example is a variation of one brought to my attention by Bernard Kobes.
^15	  This example is adapted from Karttunen & Peters (1979), pp. 11-12.
^16	  Tim Williamson argues in an email to the author (June 1, 2012) that this test is unfairly biased because racism is much more serious than the case of (9), and because beginning the responses with ‘Yes’ sounds too much “like an all-purpose endorsement of the queried sentence.” However, the seriousness of racism is likely irrelevant to the linguistic analysis in this instance. Consider e.g. the following, which also has a question implicating something racist (Williamson himself provides a similar example):	(9.5) Could even a black man prove that logical derivation?	         Yes, but blacks are just as good at logic as other people.As for the second point, ‘Yes’ can be used in more paradigmatic cases of conventional implicature in a response which assents to the explicitly stated content but objects to the implicated content, as (9) and (9.5) demonstrate (see Karttunen & Peters, 1979, for more such examples). My point is that the same doesn’t appear true for examples containing slurs. (Williamson also objects to the inclusion of ‘I don’t think’ when I give this example in my 2012 paper on p. 81, because it is softer than saying something is false. I think this is a valid point, and so I have removed this phrase here in (10) above.)
^17	  Anderson and Lepore (2013) also make this point.
^18	  A similar view was also of course endorsed by Frege (1892).
